Coordinated international economic expansion: are convoys or locomotives the answer? by Geoffrey E. Wood & Nancy Jianakoplos
Coordinated International Economic Expansion:
Are Convoys or Locomotives the Answer?
GEOFFREY E. WOOD and NANCY AMMON JIANAKOPLOS
American diplomats have been pressuring
the other “locomotive” countries —West
Germany and Japan —to take steps to me-
fiate their economies. This would have the
effect of creating more consumer demand
and therefore more world trade. Such an
“export” of the American recovery would
also, incidentally, serve to bring down un-
employment in the United States.’
The “locomotive” approach to current
international economic policy recom-
mends that the three major industrial
trading countries of the world boost de-
mand within their countries so that de-
mand for the output of other nations
would also expand. It is believed that
this expansion would trigger an export-
led expansion in the “non-locomotive”
countries.2 A modification of the loco-
motive approach, the “convoy” ap-
proach, has recently become a popular
alternative proposal.° This policy pre-
scription calls for coordinated expansion
by most countries, not just the “locomotives.”
THE SETTING
Movements in output in the major Western econ-
omies were more closely correlated in the 1970s than
‘Robert D. ilershey, Jr., “The Marked-Down Dollar,” New
York Times, March 19, 1978.
~This recommendation has been advanced by, among others,
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment, Economic Outlook (July 1976, December 1976, July
1977); the Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report
of the President (Washington, D.C. United States Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1978); and Paul McCracken et al.,
Towards Full Employment and Price Stability (Paris: Organ-
ization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1977).
3
See Economic Outlook (December 1977) and Philip Revzin,
“OECD Economic Growth Seen Trailing Prior Estimates if













































in the 1960s (Chart I).~Following a mild recession
in 1970, growth of real gross domestic product
(GDP) from 1971 to 1973 expanded at an average
annual rate of 5.2 percent in the seven largest econ-
omies, with the lowest average growth rate, in the
United Kingdom, not differing by more than 5 per-
centage points from that of the fastest growing coun-
try, Japan (Table I).~By comparison, over the period
more detailed description of the situation during part of
this period is provided in Donald S. Kemp, “Economic Ac-
tivity ire Ten Major Industrial Countries: Late 1973 through
Mid-1976,” this Review (October 1976), pp. 8-15.
5
The seven largest economies of the Western industrialized
nations are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. GDP equals GNP
minus net investment income from abroad.
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Rots 396070 1971-73 197475 197677
Canada &l% 60% 6.2% 74%
Fronce 1.9 28 36 49
Germany 07 0.8 27 36
ItaLy 32 3.4 30 35
Japan 2.3 13 17 2.0
United Kingdom 2 7 3 8 3S 67
Uneted States 4 8 5,5 LI 7.4
AverageotSeven 28% 34% 40% 51%
Souse In erna on Monetary Fund, 0 an, aton for Econom a cooper tirni and
Development, 13 S Department o coinnie Ce, an U.S Dep rtm at o Labo
from 1960 to 1970 the spread between average annual
growth rates was 8 percentage points.6
During the 1974-75 period, following the quad-
rupling of oil prices by the OPEC countries, other ~ t~t ~ ~t~it~t2s ~
supply shocks, such as a poor world grain harvest, in the period 1971-77 than during 1960-70.
and a tightening of monetary and fiscal policies, the SThe current account balance is the net export of goods and
major countries experienced severe recessions. Over services including unilateral transfers. Unilateral transfers in-
clude private gifts to foreigners and government foreign this period, average real GDP growth for tbese seven assistance grants, but exclude military grants. See John Pip-
countries came to a virtual standstill, with a spread penger, “Balance-of-Payments Deficits: Measurement and
Interpretation,” this Review (November 1973), pp. 6-14.
of only 3.7 percentage points between the fastest and
slowest growth rates. Since then, expansion has re- °Mccracken, Towards Full Employment and Price Stability,
sumed in each economy, with the increase in real
‘
0
For a description of how trade leads to mutually beneficial GDP averaging 4,1 percent per year in the seven specialization, see Ceoffrey E. Wood and Douglas R. Mudd,
countries during 1976-77. ‘The Recent U.S. Trade Deficit — No Cause For Panic,”
this Review (April 1978), pp. 2-7. Discussion and additional
references on fixed versus floating exchange rates are found
in Donald S. Kemp, “The U.S. Dollar in Intemational Mar-
kets: Mid-1970 to Mid-1976,” this Review (August 1976),
pp. 7~14.
Table I
SELECTED INDICATORS OF DOMESTIC ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY IN SEVEN INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES
Average Annual Rate of Growth
Gross Domestic
._!r~.4!~ 1960-70 1971-73 1974-75 1976 77
Canada 5.0% 6.5% 2.2% 3.6%
France 5.8 5.5 1.0 4.0
Germany 5.3 3.8 —0.9 4.3
Italy 5.6 3.8 —0.2 3.9
Japan 12.0 87 0.7 6.2
United Kingdom 3.0 3.7 —0.7 1.3
United Slates 3.7 4.7 —1.5 5.4
Average of Seven 5.6% 5.2% 0.1% 4.1%
Average Annual Rate of Chanae Consumer Price — --
Index 2960-70 1971-73 1974-75
Canada 2.6% s.o% 10.8% 7.8%
France 4.0 6.4 12.7 9.4
Germany 2.5 5.9 6.5 4.2
Italy 3.8 7.2 18.1 16.9
Japan 5.6 7.5 18.1 8.7
United Kingdons 3.7 8.6 20.2 16.2
United States 2.7 4.6 10.1 6.2
Average of Seven 3.6% 6.59’o 13.8% 9.9~’o
Average Ann~iai Role linpmolovment -
Although synchronization of output
growth increased in the 1970s, rates of
inflation experienced across these coun-
tries have become more diverse (Chart
IT). From 1960 to 1970, the average
annual inflation rate differed by only 3
percentage points between the country
with the highest average inflation rate
and that with the lowest. However, dur-
ing the 1976.77 period, these inflation
rates differed by 13 percentage points.7
In addition, the inflation rate in each of
the seven countries in the 1970s has been
well above the average of the 1960s.
The large differences in inflation rates
have contributed substantially to wide
fluctuations in exchange rates. There are
also wide disparities in the current ac-
count balances of the countries (Table
II).~It is feared that these factors, if
they persist, will lead to increased re-
strictions on international trade, as
countries seek to adjust their current
account balances through the imposition
of tariffs, quotas, and other protectionist
measures)t Also, some analysts believe
that such widely fluctuating exchange
rates inhibit international trade and re-
duce the benefits of economic specializa-
tion across the world.1°
In addition to high inflation rates,
most countries have also experienced
unemployment rates significantly above
those recorded during the 1960s. In the
view of some forecasters, this situation would be
exacerbated by the sluggish growth rates of output
°k statistical test confinned that the standard deviation iu the
growth rates of the seven countries was significantly less in
the period 1971-77 than during 1960-70.
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Ch,~
Consumer Prkes in Seven Industrialized Countries
Aesuel Peuests~e (hesgu
projected for these countries.’1 It has been asserted
that unless growth is accelerated, further reductions
in unemployment will not be achieved. At an ex-
treme, some observers fear the world will sink into
another recession.
When the locomotive approach was first proposed
in 1976, Germany, Japan, and the United States were
considered strong economies with current accounts
in surplus or near balance and relatively low inflation
rates. Countries such as Canada, France, Italy, and
the United Kingdom were experiencing current ac-
count deficits and higher inflation rates.
By 1977, however, the situation had changed. In-
flation in the United States, although remaining rela-
tively low, had accelerated and the current account
registered a large deficit. On the other hand, the
current accounts of two “weak” countries, Italy and
the United Kingdom, moved nearer to balance and
inflation decelerated in the United Kingdom and
France. Growth of output, however, in all the coun-




Against this background of somewhat hesitant out-
put growth, high and disparate inflation rates, and
divergent current account balances, policies for co-
11
5ee, for example, Economic Report of the President, 1978,
pp. 112-13.
ordinated, but varying, expansion were
propounded by, among others, U.S. offi-
cials and the Secretariat of the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) ~12
The Locomotive Approach
The OECD Secretariat espoused the
locomotive approach in its December
1976 Economic Outlook:
In a number of countries demand will
have to continue to be kept on a tight
rein until the economy is in better bal-
ance- But the handfull of countries
where price behavior is being brought
into line with acceptable norms and
where the balance ofpayments is strong
can afford domestic demand trends
which keep their economies well up
to the sort of medium-term recovery
path which OECD governments jointly
agreed last June. And international
considerations make it highly desirable
that these countries, which include the three biggest
economies, should ensure this. Because, unless home
demand is growing faster than output in the stronger
countries, world trade will not be sufficiently buoyant
to enable the other economies to move into an orbit
of export-led growth.13
The locomotive approach calls for expansionary
policies in the United States, Germany, and Japan,
with the aim of achieving sustained growth and price
stability in aft the countries of the OECD. Expan-
sionary policies are intended to encourage investment
in the locomotive countries so as to sustain their ex-
pansions into the future. Policy stimulus would also
provide increased demand for imports from the rest
of the world, winch would draw the other countries
into an export-led growth. At the same time the
“weaker” countries are advised to restrain domestic
demand in order to bring down their inflation rates
and move their current accounts towards surplus.
Hence, the term “locomotive” refers to the “strong”
countries pulling the “weaker” countries.
The Convoy Approach
In its December 1977 Economic Outlook, the
OECD Secretariat altered its policy approach, sug-
12
The OECD was established in 1960. The members of the
OECD are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 13Economic Outlook (December 1976), p. 5.
9969 1970 1972 2972 1973 2974 197$ 9976 9971
1SF ,,d U1.
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Table II
SELECTED INDICATORS OP INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY IN SEVEN INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES
Billions of US. Dollars
Current Account 1960
Balances 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Canada $—06 $03 $—07 $00 $—15 $—47 $—42 $—43
France —03 05 03 --07 —60 —01 —61 —30
Germany 08 09 08 43 97 38 34 23
Italy 12 19 20 —27 —80 —06 —28 10
Japan 04 58 66 —Cl —47 —07 37 100
UnstedK,ngdan 00 26 03 —22 —‘81 37 —25 08





PerUS Dollar 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Canada 07% —29% — i o% 0 o% — 20% 41% — 29% — 71%
France Il —04 —85 —117 81 —108 114 27
Germany —12 —47 —83 —163 -‘ 30 —50 24 —79
Italy 01 —14 —57 —02 117 05 274 60
Japan 00 —25 —117 —120 41 53 00 —94
UnstedKingdom 15 —24 24 25 49 47 222 36
Source Organization for Econnmse Cooperation and Development and International Monetary Fund
gesting stimulative policies, but to a lesser degree
and with a timing differential, for weak as well as
strong countries;
It will be essential that the countries facing no —
or relatively small — balance-of-payments constraints
should take up slack in their economies faster and
somewhat earlier than most of the rest. This is not
to say that these countries, simply by expanding their
own domestic demand, could be expected to pull the
other countries up with them, as has sometimes been
suggested. lint if countries with strong payments
positions ensure that their domestic demand rises
faster than their GNP, others will subsequently be
able to afford to impart some stimulus to their own
growth rates, because their payments balances will
be moving in the right direction.
This proposal for coordinated expansionary policy is
termed the “convoy” approach — there are leaders,
but every unit propels its own activit , The convoy
approach was proposed to take account of the impact
of exchange rate changes on the expansionai-y policies
of individual countries.’5 and has gained favor
recently. As one supporter of the convoy approach
t1Economie Outlook (December 1977), p. 8.
~~Ibid., p. 9,
has stated, “Locomotives may well pull a train but
they cannot carry goods or passengers, the convoy
theory seems more apt to cure the economic ills of
the world.”6
SOME NEGLECTED CONSIDERA.TIONS
Is There Spare Capacity?
Both the locomotive and convoy approaches are
expansionary policies based on the assumption that
there is a large ~neasure of unused capacity in most
OEC1) economies.” Faster growth is assumed to be
both feasible and attainable without aggravation of
inflation, The OECD Secretariat estimated that the
gap between potential and actual production in 1975
was 10 percent for the OECD countries as a group.’8
Since the OECD expects potential output to increase
by 4 percent per annum, it advised that actual growth
of output should be expanded to 5.5 percent per
‘°Nicolas J. Baer, “Don’t Quarrel with the Price,” Euromoneij
(May 1978), p. 55.
“See Economic Report of the President, 1978, p. 111; Eco-
nomic Outlook (December 1976), pp. 19-20, and (Decem-
ber 1977), p. 13,
‘
5
See Economic Outlook (June 1976), p. 132.
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annum to close the gap between actual and potential
output by f95o,10
Recent evidence suggests, however, that shocks
such as the quadrupling of oil prices since 1973
caused a permanent reduction in the level of poten-
tial output.’° The increase in the relative price of
energy increased the costs of production and thereby
permanently reduced the capacity of producers to
supply goods and services.
While this analysis applies to all of the OECD
countries, statistical tests of the validity of these
conclusions and the magnitude of the reduction in
potential output have been undertaken principally
for the United States. These tests indicate that poten-
tial output is now more than 4 percent below the
trend existing before the oil price increases~.~1 While
the size of the reduction may not be the same for all
the OECD countries, it is reasonable to assume that
there has been a significant reduction in potential
output in all of these countries.22
However, the OECI) Secretariat and other pro-
pos~eutsof these expansionary policies have not taken
the loss in the productivity of existing resources into
account in their formulation of stabilization policy
recommendations. The expansionary locomotive and
convoy approaches ignore the reduction of potential
output.
Why lVait for the Locomotives?
Granting that there may be a case for expanding
demand (and we grant this only for the sake of pur-
suing the analysis ftuther), what grounds are there




See Robert H. Rasche and John A. Tatom, “The Effects of
the New Energy Regime on Economic Capacity, Produc-
tion, and Prices,” this Review (May 1977), pp. 2-12; and
Peter K. Clark, “A New Estimate of Potential GNP,” U.S.
Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The 1977 Economic
Report of the President, 95th Cong., 1st sess., January 19,
February 2 and 3, 1977, pp. 39-55.




This view has also been taken by Peter Korteweg, for ex-
ample, in “Overhauling the OECD Strategy for Stabilizing
the International Economy” (preliminary position paper
prepared for the second meeting of the Shadow European
Ecom)mie Policy Committee, Brussels, Belgium, May 29—31,
1978), and Jacques R. Artus, “Measures of Potential Out-
put in Manufacturing for Eight Industrial Countries, 1955-
78, International Monetary Fund Staff Papers (March
1977), pp. 1-35.
There may well have been times in the past when
countries in surplus on their current account could
reasonably have been pressed to expand demai~din
order to help other countries. Such a period was the
Bretton Woods era of pegged exchange rates — from
the late l940s to the final breakdown of the system
in the early 1970s.
Most countries were then reluctant to change their
exchange rates, an attitude which could exert a severe
constraint on domestic economic policies. Expansion
of demand at home would worsen the trade balance
and put the exchange rate under pressure unless the
capital account improved to offset the trade deficit.2’
Hence, asking countries in trade surplus to expand
demand at home could be seen as a natural conse-
quence of the commitment not to change exchange
rates. Their demand expansion would stimulate de-
mand in other countries also,
But countries have moved to a system of floating
exchange rates. It is now widely accepted that do-
mestic economic policies will not be subordinated to
keeping exchange rates firmly in place. Under present
circumstances, if a country wishes to expand domestic
demand, there is absolutely no international economic
commitment to stop it.
There is, however, another reason for asking that
demand stimulus come only from abroad. In the
short run, internally-generated demand is not neces-
sarily a perfect substitute for externally-generated
demand. The reason is that resources — machinery
and workers — cannot switch instantaneously and
without cost from one activity to another, producing
goods for export rather than for domestic use, for
example. If a country is experiencing unemployment
in industries which are export-oriented, stimulating
demand at home may lead to considerable excess
demand in some industries, but have little immediate
effect ou the unemployment in the export industry.
That unemployment could be eliminated quickly
without excess demand pressures if the demand
stimulus came from abroad.
It is not clear, however, that the countries which
are supposed to be waiting for the locomotives to
pull them out of recession are suffering from unem-
ploymeut eoueeutrated in their export industries.
Furthermore, the consequences of demand expansion
for the surplus countries themselves should he con-
23
See Wood and Mudd, “The Recent U.S. Trade Deficit,” p. 2.
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sidered. It is reasonable to assume that resources in
surplus countries do not move any more freely than
they do in the deficit countries, As in the deficit
countries, these surplus countries do not seem to
have spare capacity concentrated in any particular
industries.’4 What will happen when the surplus
countries expand demand? They will experience ex-
cess demand in the sectors which pmduce goods for
domestic use, and these pressures will be only partly
ameliorated by increased imports. Hence, while sticki-
ness of resource movement can be a valid reason for
asking the locomotive economies to expand, it can
also be a reason for the locomotive economies choos-
ing not to expand!25
Summarizing this discussion, one reason for desir-
ing expansion to come from abroad is no longer jus-
tifiable given the move to flexible exchange rates.
Another, as well as resting on a questionable assump-
tion about the distribution of spare capacity, also
provides a reason why the locomotives may very
reasonably be unwilling to “get up steam”.
Would the Locomotives Pull?
What will happen to exports and output in the
non-locomotive economies of the OECD if the loco-
motives expand their demand?’6 Consider the ex-
ample of a 1 percent rise in GNP in Germany, an
appropriate degree of stimulus in the view of the
OECD Secretariat.2’ On the basis of past experience,
this will lead to an increase of about 2 percent (or
DM5 billion at 1977 prices) in German imports. Who
will benefit from this growth?
The origin of German imports does not vary greatly
from year to year. In terms of Germany’s immediate
European neighbors, one sees that Germany pur-
chases almost 4 percent of its total imports from the
United Kingdom, 12 percent from France, and just
over 9 percent from Italy. Assuming that these shares
2~
Severalcountries appear to have excess capacity in the pro-
duction of certain types of steel, but this excess capacity
cannot be utilized without excess capacity at higher stages
of production.
“Slow factor mobility may have prompted some countries to
intervene in foreign exchange markets to moderate the ap-
preciation of their currencies. This will retard the rate at
which their export industries experience diminished demand
and, in turn, allow resources to leave gradually the industries.
more extensive discussion of this point is found in, “Why
Prosperity Won’t Travel,” Citibank Monthly Economic Let-
ter (March 1977), pp. 1-4.
‘
7
Rohert Mauthner, “OECD Nations in Disarray Over Eco-
nomic Growth,” Financial Times-, May 31, 1978, p. 1.
do not change, this means that of the DM5 billion
increase in Germany’s imports, the United Kingdom
would receive DM0.2 billion, France DM0.6 billion,
and Italy DM0.5 billion. Converting these amounts
by the exchange rates prevailing at the end of 1977,
these are increases in GNP of 0.05 percent for the
United Kingdom, 0.07 percent for France, and 0.15
percent for Italy. These are not tremendously large
stimuli.
These OECD countries would benefit even less if
Japan expanded demand. Japan is very poor in nat-
ural resources; some 80 percent of its imports are pri-
mary products. Very little of a Japanese expansion
would spill over to the other OECD countries. (Of the
OECD economies, the United States would probably
feel the greatest impact of a Japanese expansion, and
that would not be large; Japan spends only a little
over 1.5 percent of its GNP on U.S. goods.)
If They Don’t Pull,
Are They Causing Unemployment?
Urging the locomotive countries to expand demand
may be based on the idea that they are now “export-
ing their unemployment,” as foreigners buy goods and
create employment in the locomotive economies
rather than in the weaker countries. If that belief
underlies the locomotive approach, then essentially
it is being asserted that these surplus countries have
resorted to what Joan Robinson called “beggar-my-
neighbor remedies for unemployment.”8 That accusa-
tion was made against some countries in the early
1930s. But is it a correct diagnosis of the present
situation?
This question can be addressed by considering the
methods of “exporting unemployment” which were
used in the 1930s. Sometimes tariffs on imported
goods were raised with the aim of shifting demand
to substitute goods produced domestically. Another
method intended to produce a rise in domestic em-
ployment at the expense of foreign employment was
devaluation, a reduction in the foreign currency
price at which a particular government would main-
tain its currency. A currency devaluation large
enough to make domestic goods significantly cheaper
than their competitors on world markets would, it
was believed, divert both foreign and domestic de-
25
Joan Robinson, “Beggar-My-Neighbor Remedies for Unem-
ployment,” Readings in the Theory of lnternational Trade,
ed. The American Economic Association (Philadelphia: The
Blakiston Company, 1950), pp. 393-407.
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mand to home produced goods and thus increase
domestic employment.’0
The body of analysis which justified these remedies
for unemployment has been criticized as fundamen-
tally incomplete, in that it neglects the monetary
consequences of the measures discussed and regards
the exchange rate as a policy tool independent of
monetary policy.’0 It is not necessary, however, even
to consider that criticism when rejecting the claim
that today the surplus countries are engaged in
“beggar-my-neighbor” tactics.
That claim can be rejected very straightforwardly
by observing that the surplus countries have not
resorted to any means to increase their exports
further. Neither Germany nor Japan has increased
tariffs and their currencies certainly have not
depreciated.’1
Rather than being the result of “beggar-my-
neighbor” policies, the surpluses on current account
reflect the fact that these economies — government
and private sectors combined — are net savers out of
income. That is, the financial deficit of the govern-
ment is smaller than the financial surplus of the pri-
vate sector. Were the surplus countries unable to in-
vest abroad, their interest rates would be driven down
and all their savings would be invested domestically.
But other countries are willing to borrow these funds
and pay rates of interest higher than could be earned
on them in the surplus countries. Hence, it is desired
by both lenders and borrowers that these funds flow
from one group of countries to another, and to effect
that transfer of funds the lending countries must run
current account surpluses and the borrowing coun-
tries current account deficits.’2
The deficit countries have certainly not been
harmed by being able to borrow abroad. Consider
the plight of Italy and the United Kingdom, not to
mention the less developed countries (LDCs), had
these surpluses not been available for borrowing.
29mM,, p. 396.
‘°Examples of such criticism are Harry C. Johnson, “The
Monetary Approach to Balance-of-Payments Theory,” pp.
147-67, and Michael Mussa, “Tariffs and the Balance of
Payments: A Monetary Approach,” pp. 187-221, both in The
Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments, eds. Jacob
A. Frenkel and Harry C. Johnson (London: George Allen
& Unwin Ltd., 1976).
“German and Japanese intervention in exchange markets to
slow the appreciation of their currencies may have impeded
a fall in their exports.
32
See Wood and Mudd, “The Recent U.S. Trade Deficit,”
pp. 2-3.
These countries would have had to make dramatic
cuts in expenditures and employment or else expe-
rience reductions in their exchange rates which would
have produced enormous, and in the case of the
LDCs perhaps insupportable, declines in living stand-
ards. The surplus countries have allowed others to
be more expansionary than they could have been
without the surpluses. They have not forced unem-
ployment on the rest of the world.33
What About Inflation?
Direct Effects of Expansion — if the OECD coun-
tries desire to successfully expand output, either by
the locomotive or convoy approach, empirical evi-
dence suggests that effective actions must include
expansionary monetary policy.’~Empirical evidence
also suggests that the rate of monetary expansion de-
termines, after some lag, the rate of increase of the
general price level.” Therefore, attempts to achieve
faster rates of output growth, even if they have some
success in the short run, will lead to faster rates of
inflation in the long run. Thus, expansionary policies
appear inconsistent with the currently widely ac-
cepted objective of reducing inflation rates.
Indirect Effects of Expansion —The convoy ap-
proach, rather than being beneficial, would actually
produce additional inflationary dangers. A concerted
expansion among OECD countries would trigger a
boom in worldwide commodity prices, as demand for
these primary products increased in the wake of out-
put growth in the industrial countries. This occurred
in 1972-73. As growth rates picked up in most of
35
The above argument is simplified in that it does not stress
the simultaneous determination of exchange rates and the
pattern of international borrowing and lending. It should
not be taken as implying that some countries have exogen-
ously given trade surpluses which they have to match by
lending abroad, but rather as saying that the pattern of
trade surpluses and deficits which has emerged at current
exchange rates allows funds to flow internationally as both
lenders and borrowers desire,
‘
4
Using data for eight industrial countries, Michael W. Keran
shows in “Monetary and Fiscal Influences on Economic
Activity: The Foreign Experience,” this Review (February
1970), pp. 16-28, that if short-run expansionary policies are
to be successful, monetary expansion would he more likely
to obtain the desired results than fiscal stimulus. Further-
nsore, the latest version of the MIT-Penn model of the
U.S. economy shows that unless a fiscal stimulus is sup-
ported by monetary expansion, its effect on income is
short-lived,
“A portion of the empirical work relying on the experience of
various countries suggesting that monetary expansion leads
to inflation has been collected by Karl Brunner and Allan
II. Meltzer, eds., The Problem of Inflation, Carnegie-
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Vol. 8 (Am-
sterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1978), and
David Meiselman, ed., Varieties of Monetary Experience
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970).
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the industrial \vorld, the terms of trade moved sharply
in favor of the primary producers (Table III).’°
Such a change in relative prices can be the result of
primary producer prices rising, while OECD prices
remain unchanged; primary product prices remaining
constant, while OECD prices fall; or primary pro-
ducer prices rising faster than OECD prices. In
1972-73, the latter situation occurred. Since prices rise
more easily than they decline, this would be the most
probable pattern in the future. Such a rise in prices
is not compatible with the objective of restraining
price increases.
produced by the OECD countries, OECD residents
would find themselves becoming worse off. They
would try to compensate for this by raising the prices
of the goods they sell, but at higher prices, less of
their product would be demanded. This would be a
second force producing an increase in unemployment.
OECD governments would feel pressure to resist
the higher unemployment, which could be offset by
monetary expansion. Increasing the money stock
would generate inflation, In summary there is a great
danger that the convoy approach would both amplify
fluctuations in employment and prompt further in-
flationary pressures.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The international economy in the 1970s has been
characterized by a greater similarity in rates of
growth of output among the major industrialized
countries and wider disparities in inflation rates than
were experienced in the 1960s. Accompanying thesc
developments have been sharp fluctuations in ex-
change rates and large differences in the current ac-
count balances among nations. Sonic analysts contend
that these factors will eventually lead to a disruption
of international trade and to losses in economic well
being throughout the world. Recent proposals to deal
with the international economic situation have recom-
mended that the countries of the OECD area coordi-
nate their economic policies and either have an expan-
sion pulled by the strong locomotive economies or all
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In addition, as a consequence of the rise in prices,
there would be a fall in the purchasing power of the
money held by residents of the OECD countries.
Expenditures would be squeezed and lead to a reduc-
tion in demand in the OECD, thus reversing the
initial expansion. The convoy approach would, there-
fore, increase fluctuations in employment and output.
Further inflationary pressures are another possible
consequence of the convoy approach. As prices of
primary products rise relative to the prices of goods
~
6
The terms of trade are the prices of the goods a country
sells on world markets relative to the prices of the goods
it buys. A worsening in the terms of trade is a fall in the
price of its exports relative to that of its imports. A series
of the terms of trade for the United Kingdom, a particu-
larly open industrial economy, has been published in the
National Institute Economic Review (in the Statistical Ap-
pendix) for a substantial numher of years. That series shows
that even’ worldwide expansion has worsened the United
Kingdom’s terms of trade~ 1972-74 is far from unique. It
should be noted that the terms-of-trade movement (for all
the oil importing countries) in 1974 was substantially due
to the rise in oil prices at the end of 1973 and was not
all directly induced by increased economic activity in the
West. The terms-of-trade movement in 1973, however, was
clearly demand-induced.
In fact, evidence indicates that spare capacity is not
as large as many of the proponents of these policies
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seem to believe. Therefore, expansionary policies,
either as locomotives or convoys, do not appear to be
appropriate in current circumstances.
Proposals calling for an expansion pulled by the
locomotive economies appear to be misconceived for
other reasons as well. Given the current regime of
floating exchange rates, there is no advantage to be
gained by waiting for expansion to be led by the
locomotives. Furthermore, an acceleration of eco-
nomic growth in Germany and Japan would provide
little additional stimulus to the economies of their
OECD trading partners. By not undertaking expan-
sionary policies, the proposed locomotive countries
can be viewed as supporting the weaker countries,
rather than contributing to unemployment in the non-
locomotives as alleged by some analysts.
Finally, and most important, economic expansion,
either powered by the locomotive economies or co-
ordinated among the countries in the form of a con-
voy, could not be achieved without worsening infla-
don. Thus, rather than improving the international
economic situation. policies for coordinated interna-
tional economic expansion xvould aggravate the prob-
lems they were intended to correct.
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